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WHAT DOES THE NATURAL RIGHTS CLAUSE MEAN
TO NEW MEXICO?
MARSHALL J. RAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Our written constitutions, elusive and abstract, evoke grandiose ideas about our
history, about our government and our relationship with it, and about our selfperception as a civilized society. As we read them and grapple with the scholarly
judicial opinions that seek to interpret their texts, we sometimes forget that these
constitutions also serve as theatres where dramas and tragedies are played out. The
words become ammunition in true struggles. In the case of article II, section 4, of
the New Mexico Constitution, which deals with the most fundamental of our
ideals—life, liberty, property, safety, and happiness—the struggle becomes epic,
with the personal stakes in the outcome at their highest. So it was for Timothy Reed,
a man who, in what he saw as a fight for his own life, used this obscure state
constitutional provision to test the American constitutional order.
Timothy Reed (or, Little Rock Reed, as he came to be known) entered prison in
Ohio for the ordinary, non-illustrious convictions of theft of drugs and assault and
battery.1 He turned out, however, to be an extraordinary convict. At the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility (Lucasville), Reed became a jailhouse lawyer, helping
to prepare writs of habeas corpus for his fellow inmates. More than that, he had
become acquainted with his Lakota Sioux heritage, and he became a very vocal
activist against what he saw as abusive conditions for Native Americans at
Lucasville, and in the Ohio system generally. As part of his advocacy for improved
prison conditions for Native Americans, he regularly leveled heavy criticisms
against Ohio prison officials. He also wrote scholarly articles and provided
materials for various conferences, all of which brought him increasing notoriety.2
Reed’s work as “writ writer” and activist aggravated prison officials and led to
his mistreatment, and to denial of parole on at least one occasion. Eventually,
however, Reed was paroled and continued his advocacy work on behalf of Native
Americans in the Ohio prison system from outside of its walls. He continued his
work in this capacity until he had an altercation with the husband of one of his covolunteers in the Native American Prisoners’ Rehabilitation Project. The husband
pressed criminal charges for making an alleged death threat. Although Reed
contended that his accuser subsequently agreed to recant the charges and affirm that
they were fabricated, Reed’s parole supervisor insisted that Reed report to be
returned to Lucasville.3

* J.D., summa cum laude, University of New Mexico School of Law, 2008. Mr. Ray practices law at
Lewis and Roca, LLP. He served as law clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning on the United Stated District
Court for the District of New Mexico from September 2008 to August 2009.
1. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d per curiam, 524 U.S. 151 (1998). I
will be drawing from the New Mexico Supreme Court opinion for most of this narrative, unless otherwise indicated.
2. See, e.g., Little Rock Reed, The American Indian in the White Man’s Prisons: A Story of Genocide,
J. OF PRISONERS ON PRISONS, Fall 1989, at 41; Little Rock Reed, Today’s Prison Administrators Were Trained by
Fascists: And What About Tomorrow?, IRON HOUSE DRUM (Native American Prisoners’ Rehabilitation Research
Project, Villa Hills, Ky.), 2d ed. 1992, at 7.
3. There is no indication in the factual record in Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz that Reed’s accuser ever
dropped the charges.
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Reed suspected that he was being set up. He had corresponded with other inmates
at Lucasville who informed him that prison officials intended to harm or kill him
when he returned. Based on information he was receiving from inside Lucasville,
Reed suspected that policies that prison officials had adopted were fomenting an
inevitable riot. In his testimony, Reed said, “I knew then that I was in serious
danger, and particularly because I also had knowledge about the riot that was about
to take place in Lucasville.”4 Reed also obtained affidavits from Lucasville inmates
swearing that they had knowledge of prison officials’ plans to harm him.
Fearing for his life, Reed fled to Taos, New Mexico, to continue his activism and
advocacy work. He was convicted in absentia for his alleged threat against his covolunteer’s husband.5 With Reed officially a parole violator at-large, Ohio initiated
extradition proceedings and Reed was arrested as a fugitive from justice. In
response, Reed filed a writ of habeas corpus. The district court in the Eighth
Judicial District granted the writ, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed.
As a legal matter, Reed’s case implicated two major constitutional conflicts: a
clash between the Extradition6 and the Suspension7 clauses in the U.S. Constitution
on the one hand, and a clash between the Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution and the natural rights clause of the New Mexico Constitution8 on the
other. The New Mexico judiciary seemed determined to grant Reed relief in the
form of a writ of habeas corpus. They believed his story, and in the written opinions
of the district court and the New Mexico Supreme Court, the judges and justices
wrestled mightily to save Reed from impending doom in the face of contrary case
law. Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually laid the controversy to rest in
a per curiam reversal that seemed to express not a small amount of impatience. The
Court stated:
In case after case we have held that claims relating to what happened in the
demanding State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be expected to
happen in the demanding State when the fugitive returns are issues that must be
tried in the courts of that State, and not in those of the asylum State.9

Even though the New Mexico Supreme Court invited the reprimand of the U.S.
Supreme Court, it may have succeeded in saving Reed’s life. After all, if he had
been returned to Lucasville, he might have become involved in the violence that
beset the prison during the riot. In the process it gave, in its majority opinion, one

4. Whatever may be said about his multifaceted conspiracy theories, Reed proved to be correct concerning
the pending riot at Lucasville. A few weeks after he was supposed to report to be returned there, a large riot broke
out in which eight people were killed.
5. Despite Reed’s insistence that the charge would be dropped, his accuser chose to pursue them.
6. Article IV, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice,
and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
7. Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
8. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4.
9. New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 153 (1998) (emphasis added). The legal principles will
be examined more fully below.
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of the only substantial analyses of article II, section 4, of the New Mexico
Constitution, the so-called inherent or natural rights provision.10
In this Article, I will explore that enigmatic provision. Little Rock Reed’s story
may represent the highlight of New Mexico judicial opinions dealing with the
clause—both because of its dramatic facts and because of its matter-of-fact reading
of the clause as a font of substantive rights. Even so, many others have attempted
to invoke it in litigation, both before and after Little Rock Reed. As of the writing
of this paper, one member of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in New
Mexico informed the author that the ACLU makes it a routine matter to add a claim
based on this clause in claims that it brings under the state constitution. No clear
vision of its meaning or use in the state’s jurisprudence has emerged, and the court
has never returned to the broad, substantive-rights-based analysis that shaped the
New Mexico Supreme Court’s ambitious majority opinion in Reed. The clause,
therefore, deserves attention, and it begs to be better understood. To that end, Part
II of this Article will set forth the New Mexico judiciary’s current understanding of
the clause. Then, in Part III, the Article will engage in a historical and textual
examination, paying special attention to two critical time periods in the clause’s
development: the 1910 New Mexico Constitutional Convention and ratification,
whereby it officially became a part of the constitution; and the much earlier era of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, where the language was initially drafted. Finally,
Part IV will apply the understanding gained from the clause’s history, in addition
to insights gained from modern constitutional practice, to discuss its usefulness as
an adjudicative tool (or, more precisely, a source of substantive constitutional
rights).
II. NEW MEXICO’S ATTEMPTS TO GRAPPLE WITH THE
NATURAL RIGHTS CLAUSE
Attempts by litigants in New Mexico to invoke the natural rights clause have
arisen in widely varying circumstances, and those attempts have been relatively
clumsy. Generally, the arguments that have been made fall into five categories. First
are those instances where plaintiffs have sought to invoke inherent property rights
as a means of overcoming state sovereign immunity or other aspects of the Tort
Claims Act.11 Second are cases involving challenges to economic regulations.12
Third are those that involve arguments that the natural rights clause expands state
constitutional protections of individual rights beyond those provided by the U.S.
Constitution.13 Fourth involve those cases where litigants raised the natural rights
clause in conjunction with the due process clause, usually conflating the two, or at

10. Throughout this paper, I will refer to the clause as the natural rights clause.
11. See Blea v. City of Espanola, 117 N.M. 217, 221, 870 P.2d 755, 759 (Ct. App. 1994); Lucero v. Salazar,
117 N.M. 803, 803, 877 P.2d 1106, 1106 (Ct. App. 1994); Caillouette v. Hercules, Inc., 113 N.M. 492, 496, 827
P.2d 1306, 1310 (Ct. App. 1992).
12. See Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co. v. Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co., 68 N.M. 228, 360 P.2d 643
(1961); Skaggs Drug Ctr. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).
13. See Tafoya v. Bobroff, 865 F. Supp. 742, 747 (D.N.M. 1994); Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110
N.M. 621, 628, 798 P.2d 571, 578 (1990); Futrell v. Ahrens, 88 N.M. 284, 288, 240 P.2d 214, 218 (1975); State
v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1991).

378

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

least assuming that they serve similar functions.14 Fifth are cases in which
individuals sought to challenge seemingly broad restrictions on property or
individual liberty.15 This Part examines the most important of cases dealing with
these categories and in doing so demonstrates that New Mexico courts have never
taken an opportunity to rigorously analyze the natural rights clause. This Part
concludes by revisiting the case of Little Rock Reed16 to discuss its endorsement of
the natural rights clause as a source of substantive constitutional rights.
A. Using the Natural Rights Clause to State a Claim Under the Tort Claims Act
In 1994, the New Mexico Court of Appeals heard two cases in which plaintiffs
raised similar arguments: Blea v. City of Espanola17 and Lucero v. Salazar.18 Blea
involved a tragic series of events: Two officers from the Española Police
Department stopped a minor who had consumed large amounts of alcohol and
marijuana.19 Despite several indicators that the minor was severely impaired, the
officers allowed him to continue driving, and he was subsequently involved in a car
accident, killing the plaintiffs’ daughter.20 The plaintiffs argued that the officers
from the Española Police Department violated their decedent daughter’s right “to
live and be safe and happy”—a right that is expressed in article II, section 4, of the
New Mexico Constitution.21
The practical purpose of the plaintiffs’ argument was to state a claim under a
section of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act that provides:
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA 1978
does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death or
property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation of character,
violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New Mexico when
caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their
duties.22

In other words, the plaintiffs hoped that if the court read the natural rights clause
expansively, it would use it as a basis for taking advantage of the statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity for constitutional deprivations caused by law enforcement
officers. With respect to such an argument, the court observed that “[w]aiver of
immunity based on such constitutional grounds would emasculate the immunity
preserved in the Tort Claims Act.”23 According to the court, “vague references to

14. See Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 628, 798 P.2d at 578; Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 504, 697 P.2d 493, 504
(1984); Skaggs Drug Ctr., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967; Green v. Town of Gallup, 46 N.M. 71,72, 120 P.2d 619,
620 (1941).
15. See Green, 46 N.M. at 72, 120 P.2d at 620.
16. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d per curiam, 524 U.S. 151 (1998).
17. 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1994).
18. 117 N.M. 803, 877 P.2d 1106 (Ct. App. 1994).
19. Blea, 117 N.M. at 218–19, 870 P.2d at 756–57.
20. Id. at 218–19, 870 P.2d at 757–58.
21. Id. at 221, 870 P.2d at 760.
22. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-12 (1977).
23. Blea, 117 N.M. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759 (citing Caillouette v. Hercules, Inc., 113 N.M. 492, 497, 827
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safety and happiness in article II, section 4 of the state Constitution are not
sufficient to state a claim under Section 41-4-12.”24 This analysis suggests that the
court was concerned that it would not be possible to craft a clear theory of waiver
from the vague references to safety and happiness.
In Lucero v. Salazar, the Court of Appeals heard the identical argument.25 In that
case, the plaintiff sued under article II, section 4, alleging that one of the
defendants, a police officer, shot and killed his natural father without justification.26
The plaintiff contended that the defendant intentionally deprived him of his
relationship with his natural father.27 As a result, the plaintiff claimed that he
suffered a deprivation of his right to “enjoy life and seek and obtain happiness,” and
that the constitutional deprivation gave rise to a claim under the Tort Claims Act.28
The court cited Blea, reiterating the proposition that such a reading of the natural
rights clause would “emasculate” state sovereign immunity.29
Thus, the New Mexico courts have not been open to a broad reading of the
natural rights clause that would give rise to waivers of state sovereign immunity.
The specific violations asserted in Blea and Lucero, based on failure to prevent a
foreseeable fatal car accident in one case, and on deprivation of a relationship in the
other, were not enough. As discussed below, the only reasoning offered—that such
a reading would virtually eliminate sovereign immunity—leaves much to be
desired. The courts made no attempt to delve into the meaning of the clause (and
they probably did not need to do so). They did not decide whether a more concrete
violation of the clause would result in a waiver of sovereign immunity under the
statute in question. The most the courts would say about the clause in these Tort
Claims Act cases is that “[t]he scope of the right to enjoy life and pursue happiness
stated in Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution, and whether
violation of that section’s provisions gives rise to a cause of action under the Tort
Claims Act, has not been determined.”30
B. Cases Concerning Arguments that the Natural Rights Clause Establishes a
Ground for Finding Expanded Protections of Individual Rights Under the State
Constitution
Litigants (and in one case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals) have oftentimes
suggested that the natural rights clause might be grounds for finding added
protections for certain individual liberties. This Part introduces the main exemplar
cases following this argument and discusses the courts’ rulings and reasoning with
respect to it.
One of the leading examples of this line of reasoning comes from State v. Sutton,
a criminal appeal involving an alleged illegal search and seizure.31 In Sutton, police
P.2d 1306, 1311 (Ct. App. 1992)).
24. Id. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759.
25. 117 N.M. 803, 803–04, 877 P.2d 1106, 1106–07 (Ct. App. 1994).
26. Id. at 803, 877 P.2d at 1106.
27. Id. at 803–04, 877 P.2d at 1106–07.
28. Id. (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 804, 877 P.2d at 1107.
30. Id.
31. 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1991).
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officers responding to a tip entered onto property occupied by the defendant and
discovered marijuana plots in the area surrounding a cabin.32 Subsequently, the
officers initiated surveillance on the defendant, eventually arresting him.33 As part
of his appeal, the defendant argued that this was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,34 and of article II, section 10, of the New
Mexico Constitution.35
Although it was unclear whether the argument had even been preserved for
appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals decided that it was important to discuss
the differences between search and seizure law under the U.S. and New Mexico
Constitutions. The court noted that the wording of article II, section 10, of the New
Mexico Constitution left open the possibility that it afforded more protection of
individuals against police activity than its federal counterpart.36 Moreover, the court
cited article II, section 4, noting that it
contains very general language protecting a variety of rights. We are not
prepared in this case to make a definitive statement as to the scope of the
protection it provides. The right to protect property, however, is a specific right.
Its presence in this clause might provide the basis for additional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.37

This is the most the court would say about how the natural rights clause might
function in the context of search and seizure.
A subsequent search and seizure case cast some doubt on the court’s declaration
in Sutton. In State v. Madalena, an individual convicted of driving while intoxicated
(DWI) appealed on the grounds that the roadblock in which the initial stop occurred
was unconstitutional.38 The defendant based the constitutional attack in an argument
that article II, sections 4 and 10, provided greater protections than the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “when DWI roadblocks are used to stop
motorists with no reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.”39 With
regard to article II, section 4, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that
“we…fail to see how the language of Article II, Section 4 affords more protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures than does Article II, Section 10 of [sic]

32. Id. at 450–51, 816 P.2d at 519–20.
33. Id. at 451, 816 P.2d at 520.
34. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the people’s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”
35. This provision, which is the counterpart to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall
issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor
without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
36. Sutton, 112 N.M. at 455, 816 P.2d at 524 (“The difference in wording between the federal and state
constitutions is some evidence that the state constitutional provision may be interpreted to provide broader
protection than the federal.”).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. 121 N.M. 63, 65, 908 P.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 1995).
39. Id. at 66, 908 P.2d at 759.
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the Fourth Amendment.”40 This seems to close the door on the possibility suggested
in Sutton that the natural rights clause might afford greater protections than the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, New Mexico courts have not suggested that the
natural rights clause is a vehicle for expanding rights that other clauses in the state
or federal constitutions protect. Even though Madalena involved legal principles
specific to roadblocks, the passage cited above is framed in terms broad enough to
be considered a generalization.
C. Cases Conflating the Inherent Rights and Due Process Clauses
In other cases, plaintiffs simply tacked references to the natural rights clause onto
their due process or equal protection arguments. Although it is unstated in most of
these cases, the theory of such an approach appears to be that the natural rights
clause gives guidance as to the substantive meaning of the due process and equal
protection clauses, and that a higher level of judicial scrutiny should be triggered
any time some deprivation (or classification in the context of equal protection)
occurs that implicates a right mentioned in the clause. Another possibility, as
expressed by one member of the ACLU, is that the claim is routinely added as the
basis of a state constitutional claim in the hopes that eventually the court will decide
to use it as a source of substantive protection of individual rights.41
It appears, for example, that a reference to the natural rights clause was tacked
onto the the equal protection claims without an articulated theory in Futrell v.
Ahrens,42 where the plaintiffs contended that a regulation preventing most visits in
the rooms of members of the opposite sex in university housing violated their rights
to safety and happiness and to equal protection.43 The court in Futrell rejected the
notion that the Regents, who had the power and the responsibility to pass
“reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of the University,” infringed
students’ constitutional rights by regulating against the intervisitation between men
and women in the dormitory rooms.44 The court held “that the regulation [wa]s
reasonable, serve[d] legitimate educational purposes, and promote[d] the welfare
of the students.”45 Similarly, in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, a plaintiff
challenged damage caps under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act by arguing that
they violated the New Mexico Constitution under article II, sections 4 and 18.46 The
court in both cases rejected the arguments, and explained in Trujillo that it did not
“believe this provision provides additional support to Trujillo. We find somewhat
nebulous any connection that may exist between [the natural rights clause] and the
damage cap.…”47 The court elaborated: “Even were we to assume that the damage

40. Id. at 67, 908 P.2d at 760. There seems to be a confusing typographical error in this sentence. The
Fourth Amendment obviously does not have articles or sections. The “of” is probably meant to be “or.”
41. See discussion supra Part I.
42. 88 N.M. 284, 288, 540 P.2d 214, 218 (1975).
43. Id. at 285–86, 540 P.2d at 215–16. In fact, the plaintiffs in Futrell went further, searching for an
unstated right of association as being implicated by article II, section 4. See id. at 286, 540 P.2d at 216.
44. Id. at 288, 540 P.2d at 218.
45. Id.
46. See 110 N.M. 621, 622, 628, 798 P.2d 571, 572, 578 (1990), overruled by Trujillo v. City of
Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 965 P.2d 305.
47. Id. at 628, 798 P.2d at 578.
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cap implicates the constitutional provisions of Article II, Section 4, here we do not
believe these provisions afford more protection to victims of governmental torts
than do the provisions of Article II, Section 18.”48
To summarize, the courts have been reluctant to view the natural rights clause as
a basis for raising the level of scrutiny with which they examine laws that
supposedly violate due process or equal protection. Trujillo at least gives a basic
presumption that article II, section 18, provides all of the substance necessary to
decide at least some cases. How far that extends, however, is unknown. Besides
that, the court has said of the inherent rights in article II, section 4, that “[t]h[o]se
rights are not absolute, but subject to reasonable regulation.”49 This language
suggests a balancing analysis, in which laws that effect deprivations trigger a
weighing of state interest against that of individuals. Moreover, the reference to
“reasonable regulation” evokes images not only of a balance between state and
individual interests, but of the fit between the state’s interest and its proposed
action. It is unclear whether the court intended to frame its reference to the
“inherent” rights in such a way. Nevertheless, it appears that the due process and
equal protection clauses are sufficient to handle most situations, but to the extent
those clauses are not, the courts will apply the same analysis to rights protected
under the natural rights clause as they do to rights under the equal protection and
due process clauses.
D. Broad Statements of Police Power
Some instances in which the natural rights clause has arisen seem to suggest that
the police power receives favorable treatment when balanced against it. It is useful
to examine these cases because they offer clues about possible limitations to using
the clause. For example, the earliest written opinions discussing article II, section
4, simply say as a truism that despite the language of the clause, the state police
power can be reasonably used to impose limits on individuals to further the public
good. State v. Brooken, which is the first published opinion to discuss the clause,
exemplifies this approach.50 Facing a constitutional challenge to a statute that
prohibited confinement of young cattle and horses apart from their mothers except
under narrow circumstances,51 the court discussed the police power in broad terms.52
Thus, under the police power envisioned by the New Mexico Supreme Court in
1914, an ordinance that substantially restricted property use stood undisturbed
because it reasonably furthered its stated goals of guarding against cattle theft.53

48. Id.
49. Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 504, 697 P.2d 493, 504 (1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Otero
v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985).
50. See 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479 (1914).
51. See id. at 406–07, 143 P. at 479.
52. See id. at 412, 143 P. at 481.
53. The statute was passed because, at the time, many ranchers left their cattle, horses, and other animals
unattended on the open range at certain times. Newly born animals could be reared on the range by their mothers
until they reached a certain age, when they would be rounded up and branded. Cattle thieves would sometimes take
advantage of this practice by rounding up large numbers of calves that had not been branded. The owners would
face great difficulty proving their property interest in the unaccompanied, unbranded animals. See id. at 409, 143
P. at 480.
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Similarly, in Green v. Town of Gallup, a salesman who was convicted under an
anti-solicitation ordinance challenged its constitutionality.54 Aside from his due
process and equal protection arguments, which he seemed to keep separate, he
contended that the statute “deprive[d him] of his right to acquire and enjoy property
as a gain of his industry contrary to the provisions of Sec. 4 of Art. 2 of the State
Constitution.”55 He did not articulate a theory for this claim, and the court drew on
a previous nuisance case for its reasoning “that all property and property rights are
held subject to the fair exercise of police power of a municipality,”56 and that “a
vested interest in property cannot be asserted against reasonable regulation enacted
for the benefit of public health, convenience or general welfare on the theory that
business was established before enactment of the ordinance making the
regulation.”57 In the balance between the police power and the property interests
arguably protected by the natural rights clause, the police power carried the day.
E. Challenges to Economic Regulations
The two most important New Mexico cases involving challenges to economic
regulation based on article II, section 4, of the constitution are Skaggs Drug Center
v. General Electric Co.58 and Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co. v. Ponca Wholesale
Mercantile Co.59 Both turned on arguably similar statutes. Skaggs Drug Center dealt
with a so-called Fair Trade Act.60 The New Mexico version stated that
[w]ilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of section 1…of this act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and
is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.61

Similarly, the relevant statute in Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co. involved the New
Mexico Cigarette Fair Trade Act, which made it illegal for any retailer or
wholesaler to advertise, offer for sale, or sell at retail or wholesale any cigarettes
at less than cost to such retailer or wholesaler.62

54. 46 N.M. 71, 72, 120 P.2d 619, 620 (1941). The statute stated:
The practice of going in and upon private residences in the Town of Gallup, New Mexico, by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants, and transient vendors of merchandise, not
having been requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners, occupant or occupants of said
private residence, for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, and
merchandise, or for the purpose of disposing of or peddling or hawking the same, is hereby
declared to be a nuisance, and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor.
Id. at 72, 120 P.2d at 619.
55. Id. at 73, 120 P.2d at 620.
56. Id. at 75, 120 P.2d at 621.
57. Id. at 75, 120 P.2d at 621.
58. 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).
59. 68 N.M. 228, 360 P.2d 643 (1961).
60. Skaggs Drug Ctr., 63 N.M. at 216, 315 P.2d at 967.
61. NMSA 1953, § 49-2-2 (1937) (as cited in Skaggs Drug Ctr., 63 N.M. at 218–19, 315 P.2d at 969)
(subsequently repealed).
62. NMSA 1953, §§ 49-3-1 to 49-3-14 (1949) (as cited in Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., 68 N.M. at
230–31, 360 P.2d at 644).
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In both cases, parties antagonistic to the statutes asserted that the natural rights
clause was violated. In neither case, however, did the party asserting the
constitutional violation articulate a clear theory of how the clause applied. In
Skaggs Drug Center, a drugstore facing actions under the statute for selling below
prices that had been fixed by General Electric (and one other company) confusingly
argued that the statute “deprive[d it] of property without due process of law, in
violation of Article II, §§ 4 and 18 of the Constitution of the State of New
Mexico.”63 In Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., the argument amounted to a due
process claim—“that [the law] violate[d] Article II, §§ 4 and 18 of the New Mexico
Constitution and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”64
Specifically, the contention was that the law was “an unreasonable and arbitrary
interference with private property rights; that it ha[d] no reasonable or substantial
relation to the public morals, safety or general welfare; and that it [was] not within
the proper exercise of the police power of the state.”65
The courts’ answers to the two challenges did nothing to advance an
understanding of how the natural rights clause should inform constitutional rights
jurisprudence, but they shed light on a related issue. How much deference a court
gives to economic regulation has been a very controversial question, and these cases
show that New Mexico, despite its constitution’s supposed libertarian, laissez-faire
roots,66 while showing signs in Skaggs Drug Center that it might scrutinize
economic regulations, apparently abandoned any effort to strictly scrutinize the
legislature’s chosen economic policies by the time of Rocky Mountain Wholesale
Co.
In Skaggs Drug Center, the earlier of the two cases, the court struck down the
Fair Trade Act in question.67 In support of its holding, the court surveyed case law
from various jurisdictions and an article in a law review to determine that, “it is
obvious that the whole scheme of the Fair Trade Acts is one for private, rather than
public, gain, a scheme fathered by highly organized groups of distributors and
retailers interested not in the public weal, but only in their own selfish ends.”68
Thus, the court found the Act’s anti-competitive nature to be repugnant to the
constitution, stating that “[the Act] is unconstitutional and void as an arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of the police power without any substantial relation to [it].”69
Note the low level of deference that the court paid to the legislation: The law
needed a “substantial relation” to a valid exercise of the police power. This looks
a lot like the language of substantive due process jurisprudence, where a court
would weigh individual, fundamental rights against the state’s police powers with
a presumption in favor of those fundamental liberties. The court in this case seems

63. Skaggs Drug Ctr., 63 N.M. at 220, 315 P.2d at 970. In the framework that I have presented, this case
obviously falls under the section discussing instances where parties have conflated the natural rights clause with
the due process clause. Even so, I include it here to further the discussion of economic regulations.
64. Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., 68 N.M. at 231, 360 P.2d at 645.
65. Id. The last two arguments, by the way, are redundant.
66. See DOROTHY I. CLINE, NEW MEXICO’S 1910 CONSTITUTION: A 19TH CENTURY PRODUCT 21 (The
Lightning Tree 1985).
67. 63 N.M. at 226–27, 315 P.2d at 974.
68. Id. at 224–25, 315 P.2d at 973 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 226–27, 315 P.2d at 974.
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to have applied a higher level of scrutiny (though not by any means a strict one)
than what might be seen today. The court did not, however, make reference to the
natural rights clause in its holding, so its impact is unknown.
In Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., which came just four years later, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico upheld a statute that was, as mentioned earlier, very similar
to the one in Skaggs Drug Center. Again, the natural rights clause seems to have
played no role in the outcome. Instead, the court did a due process analysis.70 This
time, however, the tenor was markedly different. The court stated that, “it has been
firmly established that a state is free to adopt an economic policy that may
reasonably be deemed to promote the public welfare and may enforce that policy
by appropriate legislation…so long as such legislation has a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.”71 The fact
that the court cited to Nebbia v. New York72 demonstrates that if New Mexico ever
had an era of high scrutiny of economic legislation, that era was over.
F. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz Seems to Breathe Substantive Life into the Natural
Rights Clause
As a final discussion of New Mexico precedent, it is appropriate to discuss the
New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz.73 In Reed, the
majority of the court found the natural rights clause to be a source of substantive
protection and afforded relief based upon it. The per curiam reversal at the hands
of the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently cast doubt on the clause’s use in the
specific circumstances of the case. The opinion still stands, however, as recognition
of the clause as a judicial tool for protecting individual rights. It is therefore
necessary to probe its analysis.
As stated in Part I, Reed had filed for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his
detention and extradition to Ohio. The standard governing such challenges was
given in Michigan v. Doran.74 Under Doran, a state court’s ability to review an
extradition order was supposedly very narrow.75 This would make sense,
considering the valid concern that a state (like New Mexico) would create ways to
challenge the merits of other states’ convictions and become a haven for fugitives.
Against this better judgment, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the writ
granted in the lower court.76 The following language from the case suggests the
posture that the court was taking: “[D]espite proclamations that ‘the commands of
the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and afford no discretion to the executive
officers or courts of the asylum state,’ the U.S. Supreme Court must have intended

70. Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co., 68 N.M. at 231, 360 P.2d at 645.
71. Id.
72. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In Nebbia, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law governing milk prices. The case
is often suggested to be the harbinger of the end for the Lochner era. As one commentator has said, “in Nebbia,
the Court appeared to question the premises of the Lochner era that government only could regulate to achieve a
police purpose and that the Court needed to review laws aggressively to ensure that they truly served a police
purpose.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.3, at 622 (3d ed. 2006).
73. 1997-NMSC-055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d per curiam, 524 U.S. 151 (1998).
74. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
75. See id. at 288–89.
76. Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 126, 947 P.2d at 112.
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some sort of inquiry.…”77 Accordingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated,
“We hold that the extradition process was not meant to abrogate the New Mexico
Constitution which regards ‘seeking and obtaining safety’ as a ‘natural, inherent and
inalienable’ right. Reed came to New Mexico explicitly for the purpose of ‘seeking
and obtaining safety.’”78
The court summed up its reason for affirming the writ by stating that “Reed, in
seeking refuge from injustice, is not a fugitive from justice.”79 The court explained
its authority for making such a finding in the following terms: “The New Mexico
Constitution guarantees rights that no law can abrogate. In addition to our own Bill
of Rights, the New Mexico Constitution offers unique protections that are not
duplicated by its federal counterpart.”80 The court’s analysis of these “unique
protections” went the full distance to declare that the natural rights clause provides
substance to the due process clause beyond life, liberty, and property, to “the more
expansive guarantee of obtaining safety.”81 Although the court did not define safety,
it suggested that it was within a state’s ability to make such a guarantee, given “the
more intimate relationship existing between a state government and its people, as
well as the more expansive role states traditionally have played in keeping and
maintaining the peace within their borders.”82
In sum, the New Mexico courts do not have a clear jurisprudence on the natural
rights clause of the constitution. In fact, none of the cases invoke traditional natural
rights theory, which I discuss in the next Part. Instead, the above cases suggest that
the courts either ignore or side-step the text and do a due process analysis, or they
read the text literally as either offering or not offering extra rights beyond those
listed in the due process clause. Such shallow analysis, however, has not helped
New Mexico’s courts reach a more complete understanding of the natural rights
clause. If a court is going to find that the natural rights clause provides substantive
rights, the court should be able to convincingly articulate why it is doing so and
what principle guides the determination. On the other hand, if the court finds that
the clause is not an enforceable source of rights, the court should be able to
intelligently explain its basis for finding that a clause that appears to explicitly
provide strong protections for individuals rights is not judicially enforceable.
III. SEARCHING THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE NATURAL RIGHTS
CLAUSE TO DISCOVER ITS MEANING
The verbal formula of article II, section 4, of the New Mexico Constitution is
simple on its face: “All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural,
inherent, and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of

77. Id. ¶ 17, 947 P.2d at 100.
78. Id. ¶105, 947 P.2d at 107 (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4).
79. Id. ¶ 94, 947 P.2d at 105.
80. Id. ¶ 93, 947 P.2d at 104–05.
81. Id. ¶ 105, 947 P.2d at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court did not discuss the guarantee
of happiness as a substantive right, but they must have believed it to be on the same footing as safety, given the
reasoning of this case.
82. Id. ¶ 105, 948 P.2d at 107–08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.” These words, however, have an
ancient pedigree. This Part will provide a historical understanding that is necessary
to interpreting the words. Section A will explore the New Mexico Constitutional
Convention of 1910 and show how little that event contributes to an understanding
of the natural rights clause. Section B will examine the way in which other states
with similar provisions were interpreting them at the time of New Mexico’s
adoption of the language. Section C will probe the deeper history of the natural
rights clause, tracing its origins and explaining how those origins inform its
meaning.
A. The Framing and Ratification of the 1910 Constitution
The New Mexico Constitutional Convention, which convened on October 3,
1910, and adjourned on November 21 in the same year,83 does not enjoy the
romantic idealization with which we often conceptualize the framing of the U.S.
Constitution. The New Mexico framers had a different task before them. The
framers of the U.S. Constitution were working to devise an innovative structural
document that would solidify a struggling union without unduly jeopardizing the
sovereignty of states or the individual freedoms of their respective citizens. They
were also working in the wake of a revolution. The New Mexico framers, on the
other hand, seem to have had two primary goals: achieving acceptance into the
Union as a state84 and protecting partisan interests.85
At the convention, Republicans dominated. They controlled seventy-one of the
100 delegate seats.86 Consequently, the Democrats, holding only twenty-eight
seats,87 had little ability to stop the Republicans from shaping a generally
conservative document.88 According to one commentator, the constitution they
drafted was a “model of fiscal and political conservatism [that] protected and
nurtured laissez-faire, individualism, and capitalism, and it minimized the role of
government in initiating, directing, conducting programs and allocating
resources.”89
83. Thomas J. Mabrey, New Mexico’s Constitution in the Making: Reminiscences of 1910, 19 N.M. HIST.
REV., 168, 170 (1944). This essay was based on an address that Justice Mabrey gave at the annual meeting of the
State Bar in 1943. At the time, he was one of only seventeen delegates from the 1910 convention still living. Id.
at 168 n.1, 182.
84. CLINE, supra note 66, at 19 (“The purpose of New Mexico’s Constitutional Convention of 1910, the
seventh in 52 years, was to gain admission to the Union. The prerequisite for admission was a constitution.…”
(citation omitted)).
85. Id. at 26–40.
86. Mabrey, supra note 83, at 170.
87. The remaining seat was occupied by a Socialist. Id.
88. CLINE, supra note 66, at 21 (“[W]hen the time finally came to write the constitution for the new state,
the territorial leaders [generally Republican] were determined not to let victory slip through their hands by drafting
a document that appeared to be controversial, radical or experimental.…The most dangerous and radical proposals,
in their view, were those espoused by Teddy Roosevelt Progressives and civic reformers.…”); see also Mabrey,
supra note 83, at 172 (“The document, as finally written, was largely the handiwork of such able delegates of the
majority party.…I omit mention of the many able democrats, since these, after all, were in a hopeless minority, and,
as I have often said, were there to get into the document what they could…, but whose principle function seemed
to be to vote ‘no.’” (emphasis added)).
89. CLINE, supra note 66, at 49. Cline does not explain her contention that the constitution was libertarian,
or that it embodied laissez-faire economic theories. One is left to speculate, since the constitution itself does not
seem to adopt a specific economic approach. It is possible that she means that the constitution did not contain any
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Although the convention was a “rough and tumble political fight,”90 the natural
rights clause was not considered controversial. Instead, the biggest fights revolved
around
direct legislation (the initiative and referendum), term of office for county and
state officials; succession to office; power to be given to the state corporation
commission; specific manner and method of our selection and retention of public
lands granted by congress; authorizing payment of the bonded indebtedness of
Santa Fé and Grant counties, legalized by congress; the price or term at which
public lands might be sold or leased; the protection of established water rights;
methods of amending the constitution; the matter of the creation of legislative
and judicial districts; and the method of selecting the judiciary.91

It is notable that Justice Mabrey remembered such an extensive list of provisions
that were controversial, in addition to a great many that were easily agreed upon.92
Nonetheless, he made no mention of the natural rights clause. Although we cannot
know for sure, since the delegate did not keep a detailed record, it appears that the
New Mexico framers viewed it as boilerplate. Even if this view is unwarranted, the
least that can be said is that the New Mexico framers did not devote a great deal of
discussion to the provision. Clearly, their attention was on other matters.
Although no signs of debate on the meaning and propriety of the natural rights
clause can be found in the sparse records of the 1910 constitutional convention, it
is tempting to cast an eye toward the voters who eventually approved the document
for guidance. The principle has been elegantly articulated that “[t]he meaning of a
constitutional provision depends, of course, on the common understanding of the
citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, gave it life.” 93
This is a powerful idea, but a difficult one to implement as a practical matter. To
the extent that one believes original intent should be considered (and I believe it
should), any attempts to discover the intent of ratifying voters, either as a body or
as individuals, must rely heavily on inferences. Those inferences might be based on
external indicators of public mood at the time, such as newspapers, political
speeches, debates, and state and local politics.94 The alternative to such an approach
is to either delve into the metaphysical, or to assume that the framers’ intent reflects

language to counteract the jurisprudential spirit of the time. After all, in 1910, the U.S. Supreme Court in fact
functioned to protect just such economic interests. It was the Lochner era, and the modern presumption of
constitutionality that economic regulation enjoys today did not exist. Another possibility is that the natural rights
clause was meant to enshrine the principles of the Lochner era into New Mexico’s constitutional order by including
language broad enough to encompass property and contract rights, which necessarily underlie such principles. This
theory is explored below in Part IV.
To be fair to the Republicans, they had a sincere fear that the conservative Congress would not approve
of a progressive constitution. They felt a great deal of urgency in the bid for statehood, and they did not wish to
see its prospects sidetracked. See id. at 49. (“The Republicans accomplished two essential goals by writing a
constitution that was sufficiently conservative to satisfy a president and Congress.…”).
90. Mabrey, supra note 83, at 172.
91. Id. at 172–73.
92. Id.
93. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984).
94. See L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
567, 568–69 (1978).
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the intent of the voters.95 According to Professor Levinson, certain theories support
this type of approach. One theory is that the delegates who framed the document
acted as agents to the people who voted them into the position.96 Another is that
after completing the drafting process, the framers “reported back to the people,
explaining the meaning of the provisions by informal methods of communication.”97
It is possible that the best way of ascertaining the intent of the voters in the case
of the New Mexico Constitution is to adopt an approach that considers both of the
theories discussed by Professor Levinson: The delegates were selected through a
political process, and they went to the convention presumably representing the
interests of their constituencies. This squares with the theory of framers as agents
of the voters. In addition, after the drafting, the same framers and their respective
parties campaigned either for or against the document based on representations of
its meaning.
Thus, the external indicators discussed above (newspapers, debates, political
speeches, campaigning) serve the function of gauging the people’s mood at the time.
But more than that, they reinforce the notion that the politicians who drafted the
constitution acted as agents, and also as educators to the people on what they, the
public, were voting on. If that is the case, then the evidence again suggests that the
voters, like the delegates at the convention, were focused on matters other than the
natural rights clause. For the majority’s part, “the leading Republican
spokesmen…hammered on the statehood issue, contending that further delay would
be calamitous for New Mexico’s future development.”98 They “lauded the
soundness and fine quality of the document and forcefully defended the provisions
assaulted by the Democrats.”99 What were these provisions that the Democrats
assaulted? They “denounced the amending provisions, the absence of direct
legislation, partisan judicial elections, the method of selecting public lands, the
referendum, water rights, the corporation commission, apportionment, and other
provisions.”100
Considering all of the fierce campaigning about such a variety of issues, and the
absence of any debate about the natural rights clause, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that it was simply uncontroversial. Nothing of its meaning can be gained
by examining the 1910 convention or the subsequent ratification process. One must
instead reach deep into the nation’s history.
B. Interpretations of Natural Rights Clauses from the Era of the New Mexico
Constitutional Convention of 1910
It is useful to examine how other states viewed their natural rights clauses shortly
before and up to the time when New Mexico adopted its own version.101 This rests
95. See id. at 569–71.
96. Id. at 569.
97. Id.
98. CLINE, supra note 66, at 51.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. Although the author mentions “other provisions,” I cannot find any references to the natural rights
provision.
101. One commentator has referred to a similar methodology called a constitutional wormhole. See James
A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY
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partially upon the assumption that at least some of the framers knew what other
states thought, and possibly gave some weight to those states’ interpretations. Even
if this assumption is not warranted, something might be gained from delving into
the understanding of individual rights that contemporaries of the 1910 framers
displayed. As Chief Justice Ransom has stated, it is relevant to examine the milieu
from which the New Mexico Constitution emerged.102 For those reasons, this
Section will examine some of the more illuminating decisions from that time period.
Up until the New Mexico Constitution was drafted and ratified, many judicial
opinions existed that discussed clauses similar to New Mexico’s natural rights
clause. Similarly, many opinions existed in which courts at least attempted to
distinguish between natural, inherent, or inalienable rights, and positive rights, even
where no specific constitutional provision gave rise to such terms. Presumably, if
a right were found to be natural, the state would require a greater justification in
overcoming it. Although no easily discernible categories can be found in these
cases, some themes emerge.
Certain asserted rights, the status of which was less clear than others, gave rise
to various discussions about how to classify rights as either natural and inherent, or
as positive rights. The right to devise property by will was controversial in this
respect, for example. One case, State v. Phelps, summarized this debate to provide
a framework for analyzing another controversial right at the time: suffrage.103 The
basic question was whether the right to vote was natural and inherent, or whether
it was born of law and thus subject to the will of law for its existence. The analysis
began with the reference in the Declaration of Independence to unalienable rights.104
According to the court, the term “inalienable” was not exactly accurate, and
presented itself as a source of confusion.105 The phrase in the Declaration was meant
to embody natural or inherent rights, and the state constitutions accordingly used
the terms “natural” and “inherent” rather than the Declaration’s formula to preserve
clarity.106 In the court’s words:
The word “inalienable” was, doubtless, not used in the strict sense, because some
rights referred to were commonly parted with or modified by consent.
Appreciating that, doubtless, in most constitutions…the term “inherent” was
substituted for inalienable, to denote, more accurately, the functional character
of rights of members of a community in an unorganized state.107

Therefore, natural rights theory was considered the proper framework under which
to analyze rights.

L. REV. 1245, 1266 (2005). According to the wormhole approach, where a state’s constitution contains a provision
that is borrowed from another jurisdiction—which appears to be the case with the natural rights clause of the New
Mexico Constitution—a court will find that “the borrowed provision must be given the same meaning as it had
under the constitution from which it was borrowed at the time of borrowing.” Id. at 1266–67.
102. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 441, 863 P.2d 1052, 1062 (1993).
103. 128 N.W. 1041, 1045–46 (Wis. 1910).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1045.
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Under that framework, the court in Phelps proceeded to find that suffrage was
properly considered to be as fundamental as the rights to self-defense and property.
It was “conventional in the sense other rights are[,] which are in their nature
absolute till surrendered or limited by consent, express or implied.”108 Although the
court’s reasoning is informative, it does leave something to be desired in its final
step of deeming the vote to be a natural rather than positive right. That step goes
unexplained as it relates to the state’s Declaration of Rights.109
The main reason the court discussed natural rights theory was probably to point
out that even rights expressed in the most absolute of terms (inalienable, inherent,
natural) could be impinged upon by appropriate or properly justified regulation.110
This theoretical basis for balancing inalienable, inherent, natural rights against state
police power conformed to what most other jurisdictions did when analyzing natural
rights clauses or general appeals to natural rights.111
Aside from generic balancing of individual rights against police power, various
other cases discuss natural rights in terms of the common law maxim Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (Use your own property in such a manner that you do not
injure another). It has been suggested that at least one state had the principle
underlying this expression in mind when it adopted its natural rights clause.
According to one author, “the tenor of the 1857 constitutional debates in Iowa City
tends to suggest that the natural rights clause would invalidate legislation adversely
108. Id. at 1046.
109. The court found other constitutional provisions that supported its position besides the Declaration of
Rights. These bases were more concrete in nature. The right to vote was, “guaranteed both by the Bill of Rights,
and the exclusive instrument of voting power contained in section 1, art. 3, of the Constitution, and by the
fundamentally declared purpose of government; and the express and implied inhibitions of class legislation, as
well.” Id.
110. Id.
111. See Ex parte Quarg, 84 P. 766, 766 (Cal. 1906) (“Any statute which interferes with this right [to
acquire, possess, and protect property], except in cases where the public health, morals, or safety, or the general
welfare authorizes such restriction as an exercise of the police power is to the extent of such interference
unconstitutional and void.”); Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 107 P. 261, 263 (Colo. 1910)
(“The natural right one may have to use his own property as he wills is subject always to the limitation that in its
use others shall not be injured.”); State v. Phillips, 78 A. 283, 286 (Me. 1910) (holding that an ordinance banning
automobiles in town was not a violation of the natural and inherent rights of man because the right to use public
streets is not absolute, but is instead subject to “limitation and control by the Legislature”); State v. Snowman, 46
A. 815, 817–18 (Me. 1900) (“So when a vocation, naturally lawful, or the mode of exercising it…is inconsistent
with the public welfare, it may be regulated and restrained by the state by the exercise of its police power, by which
persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.”); State v. First Judicial Dist. Ct. of Mont., 66 P. 754, 755 (Mont. 1901) (“It may
be stated, as a general proposition, that every person has a natural right to pursue any lawful business or profession.
This general statement is subject, however, to the limitation that the person asserting such a right must, before
attempting to exercise it, comply with all reasonable police regulations made by the state touching the qualifications
declared necessary for the particular calling.”); Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 30 A. 217, 218–19 (Pa. 1894) (“Th[e
Constitution] affirms that ‘all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable
rights, among which are those of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation.’ The methods by
which this right to acquire property is asserted and exercised are, however, and have been since organized
government began among men, subject to regulation by law. The power of government thus brought into service
is known as the ‘police power.’”); Caven v. Coleman, 96 S.W. 774, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (“[W]hile the right
of the individual to labor and enjoy the fruits thereof is recognized as a natural right…, yet whenever the pursuit
concerns the public health and is of such a character as to require special training or experience to qualify one to
pursue such occupation with safety to the public interest, the Legislature may enact reasonable regulations to
protect the public against the evils which may result from incapacity and ignorance.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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affecting personal liberty and happiness unless their exercise in some way harms or
presents an actual and substantial risk of harm to another person.”112
In fact, other jurisdictions besides Iowa viewed natural rights in these very
terms.113 The vast majority of the cases produced involved nuisance or other private
disputes, or challenges to zoning laws.114 There were occasions, however, as
discussed below, where courts characterized the old common law maxim as a
general libertarian principle that protected natural or inherent rights.
Unlike those cases that merely repeat the sic utere maxim as a justification for
ordinances that allegedly impinged upon a claimed natural or inherent right,115 the
so-called libertarian cases give more detail as to how the maxim acts as a protection
of natural rights (rather than as a justification for state encroachment upon those
rights). For example, in Commonwealth v. Campbell, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that “[t]he right to use liquor for one’s own comfort, if the use is
without direct injury to the public, is one of the citizen’s natural and inalienable
rights, guaranteed to him by the Constitution.”116 The court further announced that
the right in question “cannot be abridged as long as the absolute power of a majority
is limited by [the] present Constitution.”117
The specific question that the court was dealing with was whether an ordinance
forbidding possession of “spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors,” for personal use
except in quantities not in excess of one quart was an unconstitutional
encroachment on individual rights.118 In finding that the application in question of
the ordinance was unconstitutional, the court cited John Stuart Mill,119 then, in its

112. Bruce Kempkes, The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too Tight,
42 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 636–37 (1993). This was apparently rooted in John Stuart Mill’s explanation of Lockean
theory in On Liberty. Id. at 617–19 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859)).
113. A search in Westlaw in the All-States database for all cases before 1911, using the terms “Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas” (with the quotations included) yielded 503 hits.
114. E.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, L.S. & S.B. Ry. Co., 92 N.E. 989, 990 (Ind. App. 1910);
Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, Woodmen of the World, 112 P. 255, 256 (Wash. 1910); Everett v. Paschall,
111 P. 879, 882 (Wash. 1910).
115. See, e.g., Horan v. Byrnes, 54 A. 945, 946, 948 (N.H. 1903) (holding that the “‘natural, essential, and
inherent’ right of ‘acquiring, possessing, and protecting property’” is “subject all the time, of course, to a proper
application of the doctrine contained in the maxim, ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’”).
116. 117 S.W. 383, 387 (Ky. App. 1909).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 383.
119. Id. at 386 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–23, 28 (n.p., 1859)). The court quoted two key
passages from On Liberty:
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public
opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their numbers is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of
others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him,
or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which
it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of
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own words, made the point that, “the theory of our government is to allow the
largest liberty to the individual commensurate with the public safety, or, as it has
been otherwise expressed, that government is best which governs least.”120 Not
wanting to leave any doubt, the court proceeded to hold that “the police
power—vague and wide and undefined as it is—has limits, and in matters such as
that we have in hand its utmost frontier is marked by the maxim: ‘Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas.’”121 Thus, the Kentucky Court established a principle that the
sic utere doctrine, more than being a justification for nuisance recovery, zoning
ordinances, or police power generally, also established a zone of individual liberty.
Moreover, the court found that that principle founds its protection in the natural
rights clause of its constitution.
During this same time period, California seemed to adhere to a similar principle,
even though it did not explicitly rely on the sic utere maxim or on Mill for doing so.
In Ex parte Quarg, for example, the California Supreme Court invalidated a law
prohibiting the “sell[ing] or offer[ing] for sale any ticket or tickets to any theater or
other public place of amusement at a price in excess of that charged originally by
the management of such theater or public place of amusement,” using its natural
rights clause.122 The court noted that the rights to acquire, possess, and protect
property, coupled with the right to liberty, “include[d] the right to dispose of such
property in such innocent manner as [one] please[d], and to sell it for such price as
he can obtain in fair barter.”123 Even though the court characterized the state’s
police power as broad, it took pains to refute various possible justifications for its
use in effecting the impairment in question124—that is, an impairment of property
rights and the freedom of contract. This suggests that, at least for certain rights, the
natural rights clause contained—or more precisely—protected pre-existing rights,125
the infringement of which would require a stronger justification in the context of
the use of police power.126
That the right protected in Ex Parte Quarg implicated the liberty to contract
raises the possibility that such cases are merely products of a time of intense
judicial protection of economic rights. In other words, the case might be seen as a
the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
And:
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
Id.
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id.
122. Ex parte Quarg, 84 P. 766, 766 (Cal. 1906).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 767.
125. See id. at 766 (“These rights are in fact inherent in every natural person, and do not depend on
constitutional grant or guaranty.”).
126. This can be rephrased in terms of judicial scrutiny. In other words, the court would more closely
scrutinize laws impairing certain rights. It is proper to speak in these terms, even though “[c]oncern with levels of
judicial scrutiny received its elaboration only after the Progressive Era.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 11 (2006).
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product of the so-called Lochner-era jurisprudence. Seeing it in such a light might
clarify the meaning of many of the cases discussed in this Section. I have discussed
a rough dichotomy of late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases where some
used broad references to police power to uphold impairments of property use or
liberties, while others spoke from the reference point of individual liberty to strike
down invalid uses of police power.
This division of approaches corresponds in part to the scholarly and
philosophical debate between those who view property rights in terms of “the public
duties and obligations of property ownership, which give rise to the idea of
economic liberty as a legal construct embracing the whole of the citizenry and…the
prosperity of the larger society,”127 and those whose view is based “on the
traditional concept of economic liberty as an attribute of individual rights that is
essential to personal and political liberty.”128 This essentially summarizes the
progressive and conservative views, a debate over which was raging at the time
these cases were decided. The nineteenth century saw “[s]tate governments
regulat[ing] property and economic activity [in ways that were] narrowly conceived,
did not aim at redistribution of wealth, and left owners and entrepreneurs
substantially free to use their property in socially productive ways.”129 As the
nineteenth century waned and expired, however, progressive calls for market
regulation and redistributive measures gained force.130
In the end, then, the different judicial approaches to natural rights clauses, to
natural rights in general, and to economic and property rights (as opposed to socalled civil rights131) up until the critical period of the New Mexico Constitutional
Convention in 1910 provide no conclusive evidence about how the clause would be
interpreted in our own governmental scheme. Even though one scholar argued that
the type of constitutional order that was adopted (whether or not the natural rights
clause embodied that type of order) represented the laissez-faire, economic liberties
approach,132 the natural rights clause was not invoked in New Mexico’s earliest
jurisprudence to support such a principle. With this in mind, Part III.C reaches
further back into history, to the American Revolution. It is there that the original
meaning of the natural rights clause most clearly reveals itself.
C. George Mason and the Virginia Declaration of Rights
In the time period immediately preceding the Declaration of Independence, the
seeds of revolution had been germinating in Virginia. Revolutionaries had begun
organizing and meeting in a series of “conventions.” Patrick Henry gave his fabled
speech at one of these conventions, supposedly exclaiming, “Give me liberty or give
127. Herman Belz, Property and Liberty Reconsidered, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1992) (reviewing
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1992)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. 1016.
129. Id. at 1018.
130. Id.
131. “New Deal liberals introduced into public policy a distinction between personal civil rights and liberties,
which were accorded a preferred position in constitutional law, and property rights, which were relegated to an
inferior status less worthy of judicial protection.” Id. at 1019.
132. See CLINE, supra note 66, at 49.
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me death,” and talk had already begun of forming an armed militia. These events
culminated in Virginia declaring independence from Britain on May 15,
1776—about a month and a half before the Second Continental Congress followed
suit in declaring the thirteen colonies independent of British rule. In the wake of
Virginia’s declaration of independence, the fifth Virginia Convention of Delegates
(the Convention) adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the language for
which George Mason receives much of the credit.
Article II, section 4, of the New Mexico Constitution can be traced directly to the
first article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the verbal formula being
attributable to George Mason.133 George Mason himself observed that it was “the
first thing of the kind upon the continent, and has been closely imitated by all the
States.”134 In the original draft, the first article read:
That all men are created equally free and independent and have certain inherent
natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; among which are the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the means
of acquiring & possessing Property, and pursuing and obtaining Happiness and
Safety.135

This version differs in a few ways from the one finally adopted by the Convention.
First, the word “natural” was removed, leaving the first sentence to read, “all
men…have certain inherent rights.”136 The intent seems not to have been to erase
references to natural rights, however. Instead, the Convention invoked the imagery
of natural rights by inserting an additional clause: “when [men] enter into a state of
society.”137 This change, then, seems to preserve the notion that the clause was
meant to express Lockean principles of the purpose of government.138 Thus, the
133. KATE MASON ROWLAND, 1 THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–1792, at 235–37 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons
1892) (discussing disputes of attribution and concluding that George Mason did pen the original draft of the
Declaration of Rights). George Mason declared himself the author of the Declaration. In a letter addressed to his
cousin, George Mercer, Mason said,
To show you that I have not been an idle spectator of this great contest, and to amuse you with
the sentiments of an old friend upon an important subject, I enclose you a copy of the first
draught of the declaration of rights just as it was drawn and presented by me, to the Virginia
Convention.
Id. at 237 (reproducing the Letter from George Mason to George Mercer dated October 2, 1778).
134. Id.
135. Copy of First Draft of the Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in ROWLAND, supra note 133, app.,
at 433 [hereinafter First Draft].
136. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS; THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS
COMMONWEALTH, AND THE ARTICLES OF DEFINITIVE TREATY BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Dixon and Holt 1784).
137. Id.
138. There was, in fact, a more pernicious purpose behind the insertion of the words “enter into a state of
society.” Slavery, an issue that caught in the craw of the founding generation at so many junctures, loomed over
the Virginia Convention as well. It seemed, after all, contradictory to establish a government that would protect the
safety and happiness of all men (who were created equally free and independent), and then to allow slavery. The
answer to this quandary was a bit of sophistry: the slaves had not entered into society, and therefore the government
was not designed to protect their safety and happiness. At the same time, the notion of “entering into a state of
society” was part of Lockean theory: namely, that man leaves the state of nature to form a social contract. So, the
inserted language had no theoretical impact on the clause, except to muddle it. After all, Locke’s natural rights were
not gained by entering or forming society—such rights were inherent. Even so, it served to ease the minds of proslavery delegates. See Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the Constitution, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1579–80
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meaning and purposes of the clause did not suffer a change as a result of these
minor alterations from draft to adoption.
What, then, was the purpose of the clause? First, as mentioned in the previous
paragraph, it was meant to invoke philosophical theories of government propounded
by the likes of John Locke. That will be discussed below. More immediately, the
drafter, Mr. Mason, and those who eventually adopted the language, hung another
important duty upon the clause: It was to summarize the moral and intellectual basis
for revolution.139
The revolutionary character of the language becomes clear as the first article of
the Declaration of Rights is studied in conjunction with one of its sister articles.
Article III of the adopted Declaration states that “government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection and Security of the People, Nation, or
Community. Of all the various modes and forms of Government that is best, which
is capable of producing the greatest Degree of Happiness and Safety.…”140 To that
end, the language continues, “wherever any Government shall be found inadequate
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the Community hath an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as
shall be judged most conducive to the public Weal.”141 When articles I and III are
read together, they lay a foundation for revolution: that the purpose of government
is to strive for the greatest degree of safety and happiness. Safety and happiness are
part of the package of inherent rights, and may be seen as the end result of
protecting the other rights mentioned (life, liberty, and property). When government
fails in its purpose of furthering this end, the people gain a right to throw it off and
start anew.
It is for this reason that Jefferson conspicuously relied upon this very construct
as the basis of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.142

(2007). When other states adopted the language of the Declaration of Rights into their Constitutions, they
conscientiously excluded the “enter into a state of society” language. William M. Weicek, The Emergence of
Equality as a Constitutional Value: The First Century, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 233, 235 (2007).
139. This may be traced to Locke as well. “As suggested by the philosopher John Locke, the right of
revolution arose only under the most dire circumstances. Americans considered that their plight met this test.”
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 13 (2008).
140. First Draft, supra note 135, at art. III.
141. Id.
142. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE PARA. 3 (U.S. 1776). The original handwritten version uses the
formula “life, liberty, and the pursuit of property.” Subsequent versions substituted the phrase happiness.
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Although it is not a verbatim reproduction, the U.S. Declaration of Independence
bears the indelible imprint of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.143
Thus, article I was not viewed as a tool of adjudication, as a due process clause
might be. It was not conceived that someone would walk into a courtroom, pointing
to the clause and asking for its judicial enforcement. The drafters of the first article
were more ambitious: They viewed the rights enshrined in the article as a basis for
taking up arms and rejecting a failing government. Edmund Randolph recalled the
discussions at the Virginia Convention about article I in these terms:
[T]he declaration in the first article…was opposed by Robert Carter Nicholas,
as being the forerunner or pretext of civil convulsion. It was answered…that with
arms in our hands, asserting the general rights of man, we ought not to be too
nice and too much restricted in the declaration of them.144

Further evidence that article I was not designed as a tool for adjudication can be
found by exploring the Lockean philosophy underlying the article. Recall that,
according to Locke, men unite into “Community” to improve their prospects of
protecting rights that they already possess.145 In his words, “Men [consent] to join
and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living…in
a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are
not of it.”146 Moreover, those who do not consent to join a political community
retain their liberty in the natural state.147 Consequently, things like liberty, property,
safety, and happiness are not derivative of or granted by the political union or its
talismans. They exist before governments, constitutions, or declarations.
Given the difficulties that man would face in securing his property and safety in
the natural state, the task, then, would be to devise a government that best protects
inherent rights for those who entered the Community. At a minimum, individuals
entering into the enterprise should experience more life, liberty, property, safety,
and happiness than they would in a state of nature. Locke seems to have envisioned
this in terms of a net societal increase of these things, as opposed to an increase for
every single individual as a component of the society. This is evidenced in his
declaration that it is necessary that the
Body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority…[a]nd thus every Man by consenting with others to
make one Body Politick, under one Government, puts himself under an

143. Although it has never gained significant support, another theory exists that the self-evident truths, as
expressed by Jefferson in the Bill of Rights, find their root more in Hobbes than in Locke. See, e.g., GEORGE MACE,
LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: AN ESSAY ON THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HERITAGE
33–44 (1979). Without denying that Hobbes may have had some influence (though his obvious monarchical
leanings militate against such a view), it is generally accepted that Locke was a primary source of inspiration for
the text of the Declaration of Independence. See, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 16 (1922).
144. ROWLAND, supra note 133, at 240 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
145. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT,
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 95, at 316 (Amen-Corner 1690).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the
majority.148

Locke did recognize the need for some check against the majority,149 and the
American systems would come to contain anti-majoritarian safeguards, such as the
guarantees in the federal and state bills of rights. Nevertheless, the declaration of
inherent rights in article I of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and as copied into
numerous state constitutions, was not designed to stake out the details of what
authority a government would have, or what form it would take. Instead, to the
extent that article I of the Virginia Convention and its derivatives150 represented
Locke’s basic understanding of the ends of government, they cannot be said to have
granted rights. They instead memorialized, in hortatory terms, the purpose of a good
government.
At least one other commentator has corroborated this view of the state
constitutions’ references to “inherent” or “natural” rights: The declarations were
“taken as widely accepted statements of political principle, but not as enforceable
limits to government power.”151 The question, therefore, becomes: How does the
demonstrated original meaning and intent of an “inherent rights” clause inform
constitutional decision-making in a modern setting, especially since these clauses
were not understood to be part of the “process” of adjudication? In fact, the clauses
do not define the metes and bounds of the government’s relationship with its
citizens. Part IV of this Article explores the possibilities.
In a thoughtful treatment of the “safety and happiness” language existent in
various state constitutions, former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph R.
Grodin classifies the various permutations of “safety and happiness” language that
have appeared.152 After surveying the possible philosophical influences that
contributed to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Justice Grodin states:
Both the language and the intellectual background of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights and of those state constitutions that followed the Virginia model are
consistent with two propositions: (1) that people are entitled to pursue and obtain
both happiness and safety (leaving aside how those terms are to be defined)
without undue government interference; and (2) that government has an
affirmative obligation of some sort (leaving aside the definition of its scope) to
further the happiness and safety of the people.153

148. Id. §§ 96–97, at 317.
149. Id. § 160, at 383–84 (discussing the Executive’s prerogative power to act, at times, in proscription of
or even against the law).
150. These derivatives include the state constitutions that eventually copied it, and the very Declaration of
Independence.
151. McAffee, supra note 138, at 1505 (citations omitted). The articles of the Declaration of Rights contained
other aspirational or hortatory provisions that can best be viewed as providing more principle than substance. For
example, article I, section 5, stated vaguely that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches should be kept
separate. It left the substantive details, however, for a later day.
152. Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1 (1997).
153. Id. at 19.
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Justice Grodin concedes, however, that “[w]hether either or both of these principles
are properly the subject of judicial cognizance is a different question.…”154 The
following Part explores whether New Mexico’s natural rights clause, which
contains a reference to safety and happiness, is a useful tool in adjudication.
IV. USING THE NATURAL RIGHTS CLAUSE IN JUDICIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING
Under the modern New Mexico Constitution, the natural rights clause can either
be used as a source of substantive rights, or it cannot. If it can be used as a source
of substantive rights, the question still remains: What rights will it contain? In other
words, what specific activities or zones of interest will be protected under the broad
terms of the clause? Section A of this Part will present the argument against using
the clause as a source of substantive rights. Section B will discuss the arguments in
favor, in addition to the approaches that might guide analysis under it.
A. The Natural Rights Clause Does Not Create Judicially Enforceable
Substantive Rights
The argument that article II, section 4, of the New Mexico Constitution is not a
useful tool for judicial decision-making rests on two grounds. First, the clause’s text
and history indicate that it was never meant to serve in such a capacity, but was
instead meant to express a basic political principle. Second, even if one read
constitutional text under a presumption that it establishes substantive rights, this
clause adds nothing to existing jurisprudence under due process and equal
protection clauses.
The text itself refers to natural, inherent rights: “All persons are born equally
free, and have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights.”155 Rights that are
natural, inherent, and inalienable do not exist because they are enumerated in a
constitution. They precede constitutions and governments. The fact that the
constitution mentions them at all functions almost as a mere reminder that the
government exists to further them.
Invocation of natural rights, then, does not create any constitutional rights.
Instead, it expresses the fact that the people have adopted a natural rights theory of
government. Thus, the government, if legitimate under this clause, should be shaped
in such a way that New Mexico citizens receive the maximum benefit of the
traditional natural rights to life, liberty, and property.156 That would be

154. Id. Ultimately, Justice Grodin surveys various arguments and concludes that, in the appropriate
situation, either principle might support judicial action. Under the first principle, he argues that, if we accept the
notion of a living constitution that adapts to its environment, it is not ridiculous to imagine references to safety and
happiness providing sources of judicially enforceable protections against government encroachment. See id. at 34.
Moreover, Justice Grodin contends that circumstances might arise where a court could rely on such language to
impose affirmative duties on a government to assure certain entitlements. See id. at 29–33.
155. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4.
156. Life, liberty, and property have been characterized as “perhaps, the most elementary and important rights
conceivable, and are the ones with the development of which English constitutional history is chiefly concerned.”
Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty” in Those Clauses in the Federal and State
Constitutions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property,” 4 HARV. L. REV. 365, 374 (1890). Shattuck traced the
formulations concerning life, liberty, and property to the Magna Carta, and to some other statutes, which shortly
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accomplished by giving the government the proper shape through the structural
provisions of the state’s constitution and by demanding and defining proper
procedures for redress where either public or private activity leads to deprivations.
Understanding natural rights in this way helps clear up some confusion that the
plain language creates. In fact, it may be argued that article II, section 4 (or any of
its sisters), is incomprehensible on its face. Without the established philosophical
framework of natural rights, a casual reading of words such as “inherent” and
“inalienable” would be cause for alarm, considering the reality that governments
organized in the United States have always had the ability to take life, liberty, and
property from citizens. In other words, if rights to life, liberty, and property are
described in a constitution as inherent and inalienable, one might be tempted to say
that they should be unreachable by government action; since in reality, government
has always had ample ability to reach them, the words “inherent” and “inalienable”
that accompany the rights are in fact empty and meaningless. Reading the clause for
what it purports to be (an invocation of natural rights theory) solves this problem.
As discussed above, the rights are inherent and natural in the sense that each
person is naturally free with respect to them without answering to someone else.157
Because of many factors, however, including human nature, man can never fully
enjoy these rights to the fullest extent possible outside of government.158 This is
because in a state of nature, all men equally have an “executive power” whereby
they can punish others who violate the laws of nature as to them. In this situation,
men come into conflict, and each one faces the temptation to decide any dispute in
his own favor; not out of reason, but out of bias. Men thus give up their executive
power, and vest certain authorities in a government to rule over them.159 Such
governments rightfully have the ability to distribute benefits and burdens, and to
place limits on natural rights so that the net public benefit is maximized.
For example, public deprivations of natural rights occur frequently, in the form
of criminal sanctions (which deprive persons of liberty), takings (deprivations of
property), and other exercises of police power. This is all part of the give and take
that is necessary under Lockean theory, as expressed in the New Mexico
Constitution. The protection or assurance of natural rights under the constitution
therefore comes primarily in two forms: structural checks on the authority of
government entities, and due process for state action that effects deprivations of life,
liberty, and property. For cases of public deprivation of rights, the New Mexico
Constitution in fact does provide for due process and equal protection.160 In that
followed, and which refined the terms of the original charter. These declarations, in turn, represented rights that
always existed in the theory of the Common Law, if not in practice. Id. at 372–74. John Locke imported these
elementary rights into his theory: “Man…hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his Property, that is, his Life,
Liberty, and Estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men.…” LOCKE, supra note 145, § 87, at 305. Thus,
when Locke says that “no political Society can be, nor subsist without having in it self the power to preserve the
property,” he is referring to the English Common Law notions of life, liberty, and property. Id.
157. All men are in a “State of perfect freedom to order their Actions and dispose of their Possessions, and
Person as they see fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking Leave, or depending on the Will of
any other Man.” LOCKE, supra note 145 § 4, at 220.
158. Id. § 89, at 306–07.
159. Id.
160. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall any person
be denied equal protection of the laws.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
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way, state action must be justified in some way, either by demonstrating that
someone has forfeited some right (such as in the criminal context), or by justifying
its own actions when it takes something away from people.
Private deprivation is also provided for under Lockean theory, and should thus
be provided for in a government that claims to espouse it. In New Mexico, that is
probably manifest, at least in part, in the tort system. This fits properly with natural
law, since one of the fundamental purposes of society is to provide neutral judges
who can decide disputes between individuals.161 To the extent that these regimes
exist to maximize the basic natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and to protect
them from public and private diminution, the New Mexico government remains true
to the spirit of article II, section 4. Therefore, further substance need not be (nor can
it be) provided by the clause. So goes the argument.
One obvious counterargument to this view is that the text of article II, section 4,
contains references to rights beyond the life, liberty, and property expressed in the
due process clause of article II, section 18. This is exactly what the New Mexico
Supreme Court argued in Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz.162 The clause specifically
mentions rights to defend life and liberty, to protect property, and to seek and obtain
safety and happiness—all rights that facially expand upon the rights enumerated in
the due process clause. Professor Eugene Volokh has pointed out that the state
constitutional rights to defend life and liberty and to protect property, though
generally neglected, might be relevant to judgments about, among other things: (1)
the scope of self-defense or defense of property, “such as proposed self-defense
exceptions to felon-in-possession statutes”; (2) acts of self-defense that lead to tort
liability; (3) limits on employers’ ability to fire employees for violent, self-defense
motivated acts in the workplace; (4) “attempts to defend life against nonhuman
threats”; and (5) bans on non-lethal weapons.163
Although Professor Volokh does not offer a framework for dealing with these
rights, he provides a valuable survey of case law in which state courts have
interpreted provisions that refer to the rights to defend life and liberty and to protect
property.164 Professor Volokh also notes that there is a substantial tradition of courts
finding these provisions to represent judicially enforceable rights.165 The longest
line of cases finding such substantive rights originates in Pennsylvania, “where
cases from 1917 to 2000 hold that the constitutional right to protect property entitles
landowners and their agents to kill wild animals that are threatening the

161. In Locke’s words:
To this strange Doctrine, viz., that in the state of Nature every one has the Executive Power of
the Law of Nature, I doubt not but it will be objected; that it is unreasonable for Men to be
Judges in their own Cases, that self love will make Men partial to themselves and their Friends.
And on the other side ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in punishing
others. And hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed Government to refrain the partiality and violence of Men.
LOCKE, supra note 145, § 13, at 230–31.
162. See 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 105, 947 P.2d 86, 107–08, rev’d per curiam, 524 U.S. 151 (1998).
163. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 11 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 399, 400–01 (2007).
164. See id. at 407–14.
165. Id. at 401.
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landowner’s crops.”166 This precedent, which dates back to 1917 using language that
often appears in natural rights clauses, is strong evidence that the natural rights
clauses can be used to protect individual rights.
Under a framers’ intent understanding, however, even such case law does not
overcome the fact that the original drafters of the language from which these clauses
are drawn did not understand the verbal formulas to provide substantive, judicially
enforceable rights. It is less than self-evident, for example, that the guarantees found
in the natural rights clause actually add anything to the classic formulation of life,
liberty, and property. During the time period when the New Mexico Constitution
(and thus the natural rights clause) was adopted, at least some courts understood
“the right of ‘acquiring, possessing and protecting property’” as a basic “right to
acquire and possess the absolute and unqualified title to every species of property
recognized by law, with all the rights incidental thereto.”167 In other words, the
phrase found in the natural rights clause simply summarized the property right; it
did not in any way expand it beyond traditional understanding.
The same might be said of the right to pursue happiness. It has been analyzed as
a reference to property rights. One court explained:
Unquestionably [the pursuit of happiness] covers the idea of the acquisition of
private property; not that the possession of property is the supreme good, but that
there is planted in the breast of every person the desire to possess something
useful or something pleasing which will serve to render life enjoyable, which
shall be his very own, and which he may dispose of as he chooses, or leave to his
children or his dependents at his decease. To deny that there is such universal
desire, or to deny that the fulfillment of this desire contributes in a large degree
to the attainment of human happiness is to deny a fact as patent as the shining of
the sun at noonday. And so we find that, however far we penetrate into the
history of the remote past, this idea of the acquisition and undisturbed possession
of private property has been the controlling idea of the race, the supposed goal
of earthly happiness. From this idea has sprung every industry, to preserve it
governments have been formed, and its development has been coincident with
the development of civilization.168

Under this view, then, references to happiness do not add to the rights already
included under the term property. Moreover, if the Declaration of Independence can
be rightly viewed as a source of national principles, then a state constitution’s
references to pursuing happiness cannot even be said to add any new principle that
is not a part of the federal constitutional order, even where the U.S. Constitution
does not contain the specific phrase.
Then again, the Declaration of Independence can just as readily be invoked for
an argument that the “pursuit of happiness” contains something beyond a property
right. A court might hesitate to artificially narrow the scope of a word such as
happiness. After all, the original handwritten declaration spoke to “life, liberty and
property,” and yet the drafters subsequently decided to replace the term “property”

166. Id. at 408.
167. Ex parte Quarg, 84 P. 766, 766 (Cal. 1906).
168. Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N.W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1906).
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with “the pursuit of happiness.” They must have thought that the phrase added
something.
As a final counterpoint, all of the discussions about the phrases concerning
property and happiness as merely summarizing property rights still fail to explain
the right to safety. Justice Grodin, as discussed earlier, suggests that, if one accepts
the proposition of a living constitution, a right to safety might be the source of
substantive rights.169 Grodin’s reliance on the premise of a living constitution is
germane to my contention that, in the end, whether a court interpreting the natural
rights clause chooses to use the clause as a source of substantive rights will depend
on whether the court feels bound by history and the framers’ intent (which both
suggest a non-substantive view) or whether the court believes it has license, under
the theory of a living constitution, to adapt the clause to a modern interpretation.
B. The Natural Rights Clause Is a Source of Substantive Rights
Because of the natural rights clause’s murky history, or even a philosophy that
disfavors historical analysis—such as a living constitution theory—a court might
be more inclined to un-tether the clause from natural rights theory and simply view
it as a textual enumeration of certain substantive rights.170 If the natural rights clause
is to be viewed as a source of substantive rights, a two-step analysis might be
appropriate. Under such an analysis, a court would first decide what specific
activities or zones of interest the clause protects. Second, the court would decide
how it will balance those rights against the justifications states may provide for
encroaching upon them. Thus, the analysis becomes similar to that of substantive
due process. That being the case, the natural rights clause, if viewed as a substantive
provision, could be read as putting the substance in substantive due process. By that
classification, rights found protected under the natural rights clause would be
considered (in due process language) fundamental. If that is to be true, and if the
natural rights clause is to serve a substantive purpose, it will be necessary to show
what fundamental rights it protects, that the due process clause—either of the
federal or state constitution—does not.
In fact, the answer to the question of what the natural rights clause adds to the
protections of the due process clause logically begins with a determination of what
the Due Process Clause substantively protects as it is found in the U.S. Constitution.
The reason for this is that New Mexico follows the interstitial approach for deciding
whether and when to find state constitutional protections beyond those in the U.S.
Constitution. The mode with which New Mexico courts perform this analysis was
described in State v. Gomez.171 Under the interstitial approach, the court first
169. See Grodin, supra note 152, at 34.
170. California seems to have implicitly done just this. Its natural rights clause, substantially similar to New
Mexico’s, originally referred to the rights to defend life and liberty, to obtain, possess, and protect property, and
to pursue and obtain safety and happiness. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1972). In 1972, the constitution was
amended by initiative to include a specific grant of privacy. This act of amending the natural rights clause
forecloses both of the originalist arguments discussed in Part IV.A. First, the people clearly understand the clause
to protect substantive rights; otherwise they would not have seen the value in adding to its wording. Second, the
Lockean linguistic formula was broken with the addition of a right that, as understood today, arguably had nothing
to do with original Lockean notions.
171. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19–23, 932 P.2d 1, 7–8.
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determines whether an asserted right is protected under the U.S. Constitution. If it
is, then the state constitutional question is not reached.172 If it is not, a second step
is performed in which the court asks whether “flawed federal [constitutional]
analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive
state characteristics” call for protections beyond those in the U.S. Constitution.173
Therefore, the syllogism for finding that the natural rights clause adds extra
protection in the state constitution would be as follows: The due process clause of
the New Mexico Constitution, based on an interstitial analysis, gives more
protection than the federal. This may be because of differences in governmental
structure,174 or perhaps because of some distinctive state characteristic. One such
distinctive characteristic would be the existence of the natural rights clause in the
New Mexico Constitution. That clause would be said to promote a baseline set of
constitutional rights that the state has assumed the responsibility of protecting. The
interstitial analysis, then, would provide a judicial framework for a court to
announce that the natural rights clause gives rise to greater substantive due process
protection than the U.S. Constitution. It would first have to be determined, however,
whether federal substantive due process already covers what New Mexico’s natural
rights clause would, based on modern judicial interpretation.
New Mexico courts have explained federal substantive due process analysis as
follows: The concept of substantive due process exists to protect against
government action “that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,”175 or fundamental rights.176 In accord with this, the
New Mexico courts consider rights fundamental, and thus evocative of stricter
scrutiny of state action that impinges upon them, when the U.S. Supreme Court
does.177 There are no occasions where a New Mexico court has expressed a view
that substantive due process under the state constitution is more expansive than
substantive due process under the U.S. Constitution. However, it would not be
entirely unprincipled in doing so. As discussed above, the interstitial approach
provides a framework with which a court could say that the natural rights clause
bolsters or supports the due process clause. Perhaps it would do this by requiring
less deference when natural rights are implicated—in other words, when substantive
due process interests, as protected by the due process and natural rights clauses are
involved.
Considering the New Mexico courts’ adherence to federal precedent on this
matter, this approach raises one distinct problem. That is, that according to New
Mexico courts, the substantive zone covered by the liberty aspect of due process
protects “[f]undamental rights [that] essentially have emanated from natural law

172. Id. ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
173. Id.
174. Recall that the New Mexico Supreme Court made exactly such a determination when it referred to the
more intimate relationship between state governments and people. See supra Part II.F, discussing the case of Reed
v. State ex rel. Ortiz.
175. State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 40, 923 P.2d 1131, 1144 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 89–96, 86 P.3d 1050, 1076–79 (surveying U.S. Supreme
Court opinions on liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause).
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concepts or very basic liberal (in the nineteenth century sense of the term)
democratic concepts clearly essential to individual liberty in this Country in the
view of a majority of Justices of the United States Supreme Court.”178 The natural
rights clause, being concerned with natural law, becomes merely duplicative of
what liberty under due process provides. Even if this view is qualified by the
reference to “the view of a majority of Justices of the United States Supreme
Court,” this can hardly be viewed as espousing a principle that our court merely
waits to see how the votes will come down at the federal level. Rather, it is more
probable that the New Mexico courts find the principles used by the Supreme
Court—the analysis of history to discover natural rights, or rights necessary to
individual liberty—as being the proper ones upon which to rest an inquiry into
implied rights. This brings us full circle back to natural rights.
One other possibility by which the natural rights clause might bolster the due
process clause in a meaningful way is to view it as protecting substantive due
process rights as they were understood at the time of the drafting of the New
Mexico Constitution.179 This, of course, inevitably references Lochner, since that
case in many ways defines the doctrine of substantive due process as it existed
when New Mexico gained statehood. Natural law and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
view of natural law at the time provided robust protections for liberty of contract,
and skepticism toward economic regulation. One commentator has referred to the
entire approach of protecting economic liberty as part of a classical liberal tradition
that saw the constitutional order as being designed to protect individual freedom
and Adam Smith-style laissez-faire free market economics.180 If that was in fact the
milieu out of which the New Mexico Constitution emerged—and it has already been
argued that it was181—then some attention should be paid to that understanding of
due process.
One critique of this approach is that Lochner-era jurisprudence was
unprincipled,182 and that a foray into that arena would return us to a worse, less
enlightened time. This, however, need not be the case. Even if the heavy handed
scrutiny with which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down laws interfering with
economic or contractual liberty is considered overly active and unprincipled,183 a
modern court could adopt a moderated approach to protect a liberty interest that,
although not recognized as part of modern federal substantive due process

178. Id. ¶ 91, 86 P.3d at 1077 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
179. Cf. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 441, 863 P.2d 1052, 1062 (1993) (“[R]elevant to our interpretation
of Article II, Section 10 is the milieu from which the New Mexico search and seizure provision emerged.”). If such
inquiry into the milieu is warranted in search and seizure law, it would arguably be with respect to due process and
natural rights as well.
180. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 126.
181. See CLINE, supra note 66, at 49 (“The Constitution, a model of fiscal and political conservatism,
protected and nurtured laissez-faire, individualism, and capitalism, and it minimized the role of government.…”).
182. Cf. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 112 N.M. 379, 386, 815 P.2d 1169, 1176
(1991).
183. The accusation that it was unprincipled is unfair, anyway. The jurisprudence of the time arguably
followed the principles of classical liberalism, which militated against market regulation, except where necessary
to protect competition or to regulate industries affected with a public interest, and stood for minimal governmental
intrusion. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 126. Just because ideologies shifted in favor of another competing
philosophy of the time (progressivism) does not mean that the previous approach was “unprincipled.”
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jurisprudence, was most likely a part of the understanding of natural rights and
liberty at the time of the drafting of the New Mexico Constitution. Those
understandings of natural rights and liberty would accordingly be represented in our
notion of substantive due process.
Implementation of a moderated approach might involve merely raising the level
of scrutiny where contractual or economic freedoms are impinged. Instead of
viewing infringing state action in the most deferential, rationally based way, the
court might ask for a stronger justification or better fit, even if not a compelling
justification that is narrowly tailored. Such an approach would give some meaning
to the natural rights clause and arguably bolster individual protections.
Again, it can be argued that in our changing times, the notions underlying strong
protections of economic and contractual liberty have become less relevant. With the
modern problems associated with juggernaut corporations and increased state
assumption of the task of regulating ever more aspects of our lives, it might simply
be impossible to start subjecting such regulation to the chopping block of higher
scrutiny in the name of economic freedom. And even if it were possible, it might
lead to the alleged problems of the Gilded Age,184 where our nation struggled to
learn how to deal with mass industrialization.
V. CONCLUSION
The ambition of this article was to elicit a critical evaluation of a neglected part
of the New Mexico Constitution. In-depth study of the relevant time periods in the
history of the natural rights clause does not reveal clear answers as to the clause’s
meaning. It does, however, give clues that could lead either to a conclusion that the
natural rights clause does not provide substance, or alternatively, that the clause
might serve to bolster the rights protected in the due process clause.
Ultimately, the text, stripped of an underlying theory, is enigmatic. Moreover, the
New Mexico framers’ original understanding of the natural rights clause is unclear.
If the natural rights clause, however, is viewed in light of its Virginia Declaration
of Rights parentage, an argument rooted in original intent should lead to a
conclusion that the clause is not meant to be a source of substantive rights.
On the other hand, if an interpreter is willing to minimize or abandon appeals to
the original intent, in favor of a more flexible theory, such as one rooted in the
notion of a living constitution, there are opportunities to view the clause as
protecting individual rights. For those uncomfortable with wholesale abandonment
of framers’ intent, but who believe the natural rights clause should be interpreted
as a source of individual rights, another possible route exists. Namely, New Mexico
voters could follow California’s example and amend the natural rights clause in a
way that manifests the voters’ intent to transform the clause into a source of rights.
Such an event would solve the concerns about framers’ intent because voters
amending the clause would become the framers, and their understanding of the
clause as a source of substantive rights would be on the record. Such an amendment,
of course, has not occurred.
184. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82 (2d ed. 1998).

